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Global efforts to address alcohol harm have significantly increased since the mid-
1990s. By 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) had adopted the non-
binding Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol. This study
investigates the role of a global health network, anchored by the Global Alcohol
Policy Alliance (GAPA), which has used scientific evidence on harm and effective
interventions to advocate for greater global public health efforts to reduce alcohol
harm. The study uses process-tracing methodology and expert interviews to evaluate
the accomplishments and limitations of this network. The study documents how
network members have not only contributed to greater global awareness about
alcohol harm, but also advanced a public health approach to addressing this issue at
the global level. Although the current network represents an expanding global
coalition of like-minded individuals, it faces considerable challenges in advancing its
cause towards successful implementation of effective alcohol control policies across
many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The analysis reveals a need to
transform the network into a formal coalition of regional and national organizations
that represent a broader variety of constituents, including the medical community,
consumer groups and development-focused non-governmental organizations.
Considering the growing harm of alcohol abuse in LMICs and the availability of
proven and cost-effective public health interventions, alcohol control represents an
excellent ‘buy’ for donors interested in addressing non-communicable diseases.
Alcohol control has broad beneficial effects for human development, including
promoting road safety and reducing domestic violence and health care costs across a
wide variety of illnesses caused by alcohol consumption.
Keywords Alcohol, networks, governance, advocacy, health policy, addiction, policy analysis
KEY MESSAGES
 Alcohol harm represents a rapidly rising health problem in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).
 A network of scientists and activists played a crucial role in putting alcohol control on the global agenda and prompting
the adoption of a non-binding international agreement to reduce alcohol harm.
 The effectiveness of future activism in this area is predicated on broadening alliances by transforming the current
network into a coalition of organizations with a shared agenda of domestic, regional and global mobilization.
Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
 The Author 2015; all rights reserved. Advance Access publication 14 August 2015
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Introduction
Networks play an increasingly important role in advancing
global health issues by agitating for their specific cause, raise
resources and get policies adopted and implemented. Some of
these networks are made up of committed individuals sharing
principled ideas, while others are broad, multi-sectoral coali-
tions of organizations temporally joined for a particular
purpose. While awareness of these networked activities is
growing (Shiffman 2009), we still lack a systematic under-
standing of how such networks form, how they sustain
collective action, and what makes them effective contributors
to the policy process, including agenda setting, formation of
specific policies and the implementation of effective solutions.
The goal of this study is to analyze the activities of a network
of scientists and activists that took shape during the 1990s and
played a crucial role in putting alcohol harm on the global
agenda. The purpose of this research is to uncover the
significance of network activities in raising global awareness
and in advancing a global agreement to address alcohol harm
based on specific policy interventions favoured by a public
health perspective. Apart from looking backward at what this
network has accomplished during the past decades, the study
also addresses its future effectiveness in remaining an import-
ant policy actor in the process of implementing recommended
alcohol control policies at national levels, mainly in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs).
The global burden of disease caused by alcohol use has
steadily increased over the past decades. Between 1990 and
2010, the global number of disability-adjusted life years
(DALYs) lost to alcohol increased by 32% (Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation 2013, p. 31). In the age group between
15 and 59, alcohol is the leading global risk factor for mortality
and morbidity (World Health Organization 2011, p. 32). Harm
caused by alcohol is increasing rapidly in LMICs, where levels
of alcohol-attributable deaths, on average, are significantly
higher than in high-income countries (World Health
Organization 2011, p. 28).
Awareness of growing global alcohol harm did not emerge
out of nowhere but was driven by a network of scientists and
activists producing and disseminating evidence focused on the
importance of this risk factor as well as effective policy
solutions reducing harm. By 2010, the World Health
Organization (WHO) adopted a non-binding ‘Global Strategy’
recommending a set of policies to address harmful alcohol use.
In 2011, the United Nations high-level meeting on non-
communicable diseases (NCDs) included alcohol among four
major risk factors requiring policy responses.
What explains the relative success of networked activism in
raising global awareness during the past two decades, and how
can such an analysis offer insights into the future role of such
networks in shaping global and national policy development
aimed at reducing harm in LMICs? Much of the literature
focused on explaining growing attention to alcohol harm as
well as obstacles to adopting effective policies highlights broad
cultural and structural factors (Gleeson and Friel 2013),
including the expansion of global trade (Zeigler 2009) or the
perceived failure of earlier prohibition policies (Gusfield 1986;
Okrent 2010). These are all important issues to consider, but
they ignore the active role of individual and collective actors
whose actions define not only what is considered a social
problem, but also what public policies are viewed as acceptable
solutions.
Global alcohol control efforts have been shaped in important
ways by a distinct global health network that formed during
the 1990s and began to globalize during the 2000s. This
particular community generated scientific evidence regarding
harm and effective interventions, ultimately prompting the
WHO to adopt many of its recommendations as best practices.
But these successes have yet to translate into major financial
commitments by donors or widespread adoption of national
policies reducing harm. By 2013, less than one-third of the 194
WHO member states had adopted a national policy on alcohol
control (World Health Organization 2013a). These challenges of
moving beyond agenda setting and policy adoption point to
specific weaknesses of the current network which has to move
beyond bringing together individuals with shared interests and
become a democratic platform of organizations sharing a
common agenda of reducing alcohol harm in LMICs.
Conceptual framework
This study is part of the Global Health Advocacy and Policy
Project (GHAPP), a research initiative examining networks that
have mobilized to address six global health problems: tubercu-
losis, pneumonia, tobacco use, alcohol harm neonatal mortality
and maternal mortality. Its aim is to understand how networks
crystallize around health issues and why some are better able to
influence policy and public health outcomes. GHAPP
studies draw on a common conceptual framework grounded
in theory on collective action from political science, sociology
and economics (Snow et al. 1986; Stone 1989; Powell 1990;
Kingdon 1995; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Kahler 2009;).
The introductory article to this supplement presents the
framework in detail (Shiffman et al. 2016).
The GHAPP studies examine network outputs, policy conse-
quences and impact. Outputs are the immediate products of
network activity, such as guidance on intervention strategy,
research and international meetings. Policy consequences per-
tain to the global policy process, including international
resolutions, funding, national policy adoption and the scale-
up of interventions. Impact refers to the ultimate objective of
improvement in population health.
The framework consists of three categories of factors (see
Shiffman et al. 2016). One category, ‘network and actor
features’, concerns factors internal to the network involving
strategy and structure, and attributes of the actors that
constitute the network or are involved in creating it. This
category covers characteristics of individuals and organizations
that shape their capacity to act and influence their environ-
ment. A second category, ‘the policy environment’, concern
factors external to the network that shape both its nature and
the effects the network hopes to produce. The third category,
‘issue characteristics’, concerns features of the problem the
network seeks to address. GHAPP studies begin with the
presumption that no single category of factors takes precedence.
Instead, analysis focuses on how factors within each category
interact with one another to produce policy and public health
effects.
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Network and actor features
Among network and actor features, the existence of effective
‘leaders’ (factor 1) may be one reason networks crystallize in
the first place, and why, once they appear, they are able to
achieve their objectives. The quality of ‘governance’ (factor 2)
may also matter, in particular the arrangements created by
network members to steer themselves toward collective goals
(Buse and Walt 2000). A third factor is ‘composition’ (factor 3).
Diverse networks that link scientists, advocates, policy-makers
and others from both high- and low-income countries may
achieve better outcomes because diversity improves collective
understanding as well as external perceptions of legitimacy
(Page 2007). The fourth factor is ‘framing strategy’ (factor 4)
(McInnes et al. 2012): how network actors publicly position an
issue to attract attention and resources.
The global health network on alcohol harm represents a
mixture of an epistemic community integrated by shared causal
beliefs (Haas 1992; Stone and Maxwell 2004) and an advocacy
network that is based on shared principles (Keck and Sikkink
1998, p. 9). Underlying the network are (1) assumptions of a
direct relationship between per capita consumption and alcohol-
related health problems, (2) emphasis on the reduction of
alcohol supply and (3) rejection of any collaboration with the
alcohol industry. The network consists of scientists as well as
non-governmental activists who have increased their collabor-
ation and have formed a relatively tightly knit community of
individuals sharing a particular public health approach to
reducing alcohol harm. Anyone accepting funding from industry
is not allowed to be part of the network, although such groups
are part of the overall ‘issue network’ (Heclo 1978) which
includes everyone ‘who shares an interest in an identifiable
problem, but who might have conflicting, or even diametrically
opposed solutions’ (Read 1996, p. 31). Individuals or organiza-
tions working with industry to improve self-regulation (Gornall
2013) may share the basic objective of reducing alcohol harm,
but not the constitutive norm that a fundamental conflict of
interest prevents industry from playing a positive role in policy
making (Global Alcohol Policy Alliance 2013).
Transnational networks addressing alcohol harm emerged in
the 19th century. Largely based on the shared idea of
temperance (moderate or no alcohol consumption) as a
response to social disorder, the domestic success of these
movements varied according to existing institutional structures
that filtered their impact (Schrad 2010). These movements
pushed successfully for international treaties aimed at protect-
ing colonial populations in Africa as well as curtailing illicit
trade of alcohol across international borders (Fidler 2001).
World War I as a catalytic event led to the establishment of
prohibition regimes in Russia/the Soviet Union (1914–25), the
United States (1920–33), Finland (1919–32) and Norway
(1916–27), but the influence of these transnational networks
declined again during the 1930s. Remnants of these organiza-
tions mostly based in Scandinavian countries remain active
today and have typically replaced the moral activism with a
public health perspective.
Policy environment
Important among factors in the policy environment are ‘potential
allies and opponents’ (factor 5). Availability of potential allies as
well as ability of a network to form coalitions are crucial to
increasing both legitimacy and influence. Opponents, such as the
alcohol industry, can both hinder and facilitate activism: they
seek to discredit the network outputs, but may also inspire
collective efforts to counter commercial influence. Substantial
‘funding’ (factor 6) is often crucial for a network to flourish;
however, a network entirely driven by donor funding may face
legitimacy questions. ‘Norms’ (factor 7)—defined as standards of
appropriate behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998)—matter
because they may both shape the strategies of network members
and provide external opportunities for mobilization. In the health
sector, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a
powerful external norm raising expectations for states and
other actors (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011).
The policy process literature identifies agenda setting, policy
formulation, policy adoption and policy implementation as
distinct phases (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Pelletier et al.
2011) which create shifting venues and mobilization environ-
ments. Agenda setting targeting international institutions will
require different expertise and tactics compared to domestic-
level efforts to implement adopted policies. In the alcohol case,
the ‘producer network’ (Marsh and Rhodes 1992) representing
industry interests dominates based on its superior financial
resources, but it faces competition from other networks that
organize scientists, the medical community, patients, or
consumers. Figure 1 offers an overview of the main parties
interested in global alcohol policies.
Issue characteristics
Among issue characteristics, ‘severity’ (factor 8), ‘tractability’
(factor 9) and the nature of ‘affected groups’ (factor 10) may be
particularly influential. Networks may be more likely to emerge
around issues of high mortality, morbidity or social disruption.
It may also be easier to mobilize around problems which have
clear solutions or for affected populations that inspire sympathy
(Stone 1989). In the alcohol case, important issue characteris-
tics lead to different problem definitions focused on short-term
harm (e.g. drunken driving, domestic violence) or long-term
conditions (e.g. heart disease, cancers). Different groups in the
broader alcohol policy issue network advance different harm
reduction strategies (Déry 1984), ranging from the industry’s
focus on heavy drinking or illicit alcohol to the emphasis on
population-level alcohol consumption highlighted by the global
health network studied here.
Methodology
This study used a process-tracing methodology involving in-
depth examination of social and political processes with the
aim of uncovering causal mechanisms that account for policy
outcomes observed as well as for failed efforts by the network
studied (Yin 2008; Bennett 2010). GHAPP researchers used the
same methodology, began with the same basic set of questions
and were in regular communication in order to share insights
as the studies unfolded.
The study relied on a combination of interviews with experts,
careful study of documents and archival materials, and infor-
mation collected at relevant professional meetings (see for a
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similar approach: Mamudu et al. 2011, p. e10).1 Documents and
archival materials used consisted of more than 500 scholarly
articles, policy submissions of network members to interna-
tional bodies, editorials, press releases and WHO background
documents on the consultation processes with various stake-
holders on alcohol control issues.
An initial list of interviewees was established based on
authorship of important scientific studies, while snowball
sampling was used to expand the list of experts queried. The
semi-structured interview protocol focused on (1) how individ-
uals became involved in alcohol control issues, (2) what they
viewed as key explanations for the past successes and current
challenges of global action on alcohol and (3) how they
collaborated with other scientists and activists. A total of 31
interviews were conducted in 2011 and 2012. Twenty interviews
took place with members of the network while the others
surveyed representatives of organizations that regularly interact
with the network, including funders and collaborators in other
NGOs or intergovernmental agencies. Interviewees were drawn
from organizations such as Eurocare, the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI), the Brazilian Association for the
Study of Alcohol and Other Drugs (ABEAD), the Global Alcohol
Policy Alliance (GAPA), Consumers International, the WHO,
the Centre for Social Research on Alcohol & Drugs (Stockholm
University), the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public
Health, Alcohol Justice, and the Solidaritetsaksjon for Utvikling
(FORUT, Oslo). Interviews lasted typically for an hour and were
recorded. Twenty-six of the interviews were conducted with
representatives from Europe or North America, and only a
minority with network members from a LMIC. This reflects the
continued dominance of developed countries in the network, an
issue explicitly raised at the end of the study.
Additional interviews and background conversations were con-
ducted in 2013 at several conferences where initial results of the
study were presented.2 Interviewees and other experts received
drafts of the case study throughout 2013. Five key informants
provided detailed written feedback on the close-to-final draft.
Results
After the end of alcohol prohibition in the United States in
1933, the role of religious groups in advancing the temperance
cause declined and the frame of ‘alcoholism’ as a medical
condition rose in prominence (Roizen 1991). This frame is
today still promoted by the alcohol industry, but it lost currency
during the 1950s when scientists and activists increasingly
adopted a public health perspective (Beauchamp 1980, p. 155;
Babor 1993). The results section is divided into three main
parts. The first part provides a background on the emergence of
the public health frame in alcohol control policies and its early
rise at the WHO. The second part traces the formation of the
network during the 1990s and its role in increasing global
awareness of alcohol harm. The third part focuses on the role of
the network and its members during the negotiations of the
Global Strategy from about 2005 until 2010.
Using research and public health views
to empower the WHO, 1970s–1980s
Since the 1950s, the WHO’s leadership on alcohol control has
fluctuated considerably (Room 2005). A public health perspec-
tive on alcohol was first fully expressed in ‘Alcohol Control
Policies in Public Health Perspective’ (Bruun et al. 1975). This
study was sponsored by WHO’s Regional Office for Europe
(WHO-Euro), but considered too controversial by headquarters
in Geneva (interview 8). The new public health framing3 of
alcohol harm became a basis for two distinct research and
policy claims. First, it justified a government role in controlling
alcohol consumption using taxation and limits on marketing.
Second, it prompted researchers to study the alcohol industry
and its practices as a ‘vector of disease’ (Jahiel and Babor
2007). This new perspective gave rise to a small community of
scholars and activists based in the United States and Europe
whose initial home became the research-focused Kettil Bruun
Society.
While the public health perspective offered a new way of
thinking about alcohol harm, the network of scientists had
yet to find a policy window with ‘opportunities for action’
(Kingdon 1995, p. 165–6). This window opened in the late
1970s when the campaign against the marketing of breast milk
substitutes pushed for a more expansive role of the WHO
(interview 12) and the adoption of the 1981 ‘International Code
of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes’ set a precedent of the
WHO promulgating rules for industry behaviour. Led by Jim















policy role of 
industry 
Patient and consumer groups (e.g., Alcoholics 
Anonymous, Consumers International)
Professional associations (e.g., the medical professions, 
the alcohol treatment community, law enforcement, or 
groups focused on traffic safety or domestic violence)  
Disease-specific groups (e.g., the World Health 
Federation, the Union for International Cancer Control) 
Figure 1 Mapping the issue network on global alcohol policy.
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Mosher and in collaboration with the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a group of
researchers decided ‘to concentrate more broadly on the impact
of trade and marketing on public health’ (Selvaggio 1983,
p. 10) as well as the role of the alcohol industry (Cavanagh and
Clairmonte 1983).
Powerful member states quickly intervened and blocked
efforts to establish international guidelines designed to limit
alcohol harm. In particular, the US government led by the
Reagan Administration threatened to withhold funding from
the WHO (Grimm 2008, p. 862) and WHO leadership responded
in 1983 by cancelling funding for these activities and refusing
to publish research on the alcohol industry (Selvaggio 1983).
The World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a final alcohol-
related resolution (WHA 32.40) in 1983 and the issue would
disappear from its agenda for more than a decade.
But activities focused on limiting alcohol harm expanded at
the US domestic level, where the first Alcohol Policy Conference
held in September 1981 brought together a broad coalition of
researchers, community practitioners, and public officials
sharing the idea that individual treatment was no longer
enough. The Center for the Science in the Public Interest (CSPI)
started a campaign focused on restricting alcohol marketing,
increasing taxes, and adding consumer information on alcohol
containers. The 1983 publication of Booze Merchants (Jacobson
et al. 1983) became the basis for building two broad-based
coalitions whose membership included important member-
ship organizations outside of the alcohol field (Lerner 2011,
p. 104–106). Although alcohol industry, advertisers and the
broadcast media were able to block most of the measures,
Congress ultimately adopted in 1988 legislation requiring
warning labels on alcohol beverages.
Although the 1970s and 1980s saw a failure of raising the
issue’s prominence on the international agenda, new forms of
collective action and mobilization persisted. The brief mobiliza-
tion at the WHO and the more sustained activism in the United
States led to the formation of the Kettil Bruun Society in 1986,
which had started out as a section of the International
Council on Alcohol and Addictions (ICAA). KBS and subse-
quent organizations represented the emergence of a distinct
identity which combined a public health approach with an
emphasis on the industry as a major contributor to the
problem. Since ICAA did not explicitly ban members from
entering funding relations with industry, other venues now
served as new focal points for individuals sharing a specific
understanding of alcohol harm.
Network formation and agenda-setting
success, 1990–2005
The alcohol-focused global health network benefited greatly
from the publication of the first Global Burden of Disease
(GBD) study in the early 1990s. The GBD offered a first global
picture of major diseases and risk factors, and established the
significant harm of alcohol especially in LMICs. It found that
alcohol was responsible for 3.5% of global disability (DALYs),
placing it, tied with unsafe sex, in third place behind malnu-
trition and poor sanitation (Murray and Lopez 1997, p. 1440).
But those seeking to capitalize on this wake-up call faced three
significant challenges. First, free trade agreements emerged as a
major obstacle to establishing global regulations for alcohol
control (Grieshaber-Otto 2000). Second, the alcohol industry
had already begun pushing into markets of LMICs, selling their
products in countries with very limited alcohol control policies
(Jernigan 1997). Third, the industry accompanied its push into
new markets with proactive corporate social responsibility
policies promising to reduce alcohol harm through self-regula-
tion only. This strategy included creating its own civil society
groups,4 which rejected a public health perspective on alcohol
and promoted a narrow problem definition focused only on
drunk driving and severe cases of abuse.
Despite those challenges, the increasing harm and marketing
efforts of the industry motivated a renewed push for collabor-
ation among public health advocates. In 1990, nine national
non-governmental organizations formed ‘Eurocare’ with the
aim of pushing the European Union to ensure that ‘interests of
collective health take precedence over individual economic
interests’ (Eurocare 1990). By 1992, WHO-Euro adopted the
first ‘European Alcohol Action Plan’ (EAAP). By 1995, sus-
tained transatlantic exchanges led to a first meeting bringing
US-based scholars to London to develop a joint statement for a
WHO European Ministerial meeting which adopted the
‘European Charter on Alcohol’.
The US-based Marin Institute5 then spearheaded an effort to
create a permanent transnational group of activists, but a lack
of resources delayed the effort until August 2000. A meeting in
Syracuse, New York, brought together more than 200 alcohol
policy and public health advocates from about 30 countries and
inaugurated the ‘Global Alcohol Policy Alliance’ (GAPA).6 The
creation of GAPA reflected an effort to broaden the network
beyond Europe and North America and focus attention on
the increased marketing of alcohol in the developing world
(interviews 3, 6).
Following the creation of GAPA, outreach to potential allies
began with considerable initial success. In the early 2000s, a
representative of the American Medical Association (AMA)
attended a meeting of alcohol control advocates, learning about
the effects of global trade agreements which ‘really caught my
attention and [I] brought it back to the AMA’ (interview 1). By
2005, the World Medical Association (WMA) passed a reso-
lution calling for a framework convention on alcohol similar to
tobacco (Casswell 2008, p. 110), while the leading medical
journal The Lancet followed up with the same demand in 2007.
Funding from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF)
not only facilitated the 2000 meeting in Syracuse, but it aimed
primarily at domestic community- and college-based pro-
grammes to reduce alcohol harm. These new programme
activities expanded the network, led to collective learning
from the tobacco case (Lynch 2005), and allowed AMA staff to
engage in lobbying, including pushing Congress to exclude
alcohol from bilateral free trade agreements (interview 1).
However, when RWJF decided in 2007 to discontinue its
financial support, many of these new programme activities
disappeared again (interview 1).
The absence of resources also severely limited the globaliza-
tion of GAPA. Based at the Institute of Alcohol Studies (IAS) in
London, it used the biannual journal, The Globe, to create a
sense of a global community (interviews 13, 14) and received
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some in-kind and financial support from FORUT (Goos 2013,
p. 12). FORUT became a key source of supporting the daily
operations of GAPA, including travel expenses facilitating
participation of GAPA members at international conferences.
During the 2000s, GAPA leadership emphasized the creation of
national and regional alliances in LMICs. The Indian Alcohol Policy
Alliance (IAPA) emerged in 2004, followed in 2005 by the Asia
Pacific Alcohol Policy Alliance, and the more recent East African
Alcohol Policy Alliance as well as the Southern African Alcohol
Policy Alliance. Thailand became a particularly important partner
after the 2001 establishment of the Thai Health Promotion
Foundation (ThaiHealth) which received more than $50 million
annually from alcohol and tobacco excise taxes to promote public
health programmes. Since 2012, GAPA and its partners organize
annual global meetings for its membership. These conferences
facilitate learning across national alcohol activists and also reflect a
wider network which includes FORUT and IOGT International
with affiliate organizations based in Asia, Africa, and Europe.
Despite this expansion of the global network, GAPA remains
constituted by the ties among independent individuals, rather than
institutionalized co-operation across organizations pooling re-
sources at domestic and international levels.
The situation is very different at the European level, where
Eurocare‘s participation in policy-making has changed signifi-
cantly over time (interview 15). As WHO-Euro was slowly
replaced by the European Commission as the major player in
regional policy development, Eurocare now receives substantial
funding (2008 budget: E216 000) from the Commission and has
to accept that the Commission provides equal access to both
commercial interests and public health groups. The rise of the
Commission as a key regional actor on alcohol policies has
generated mixed results. On the one hand, the Commission has
provided funding to a number of new research initiatives
designed to increase knowledge about alcohol harm. New
efforts included the creation of the Alcohol Measures for Public
Health Research Alliance (AMPHORA), which specifically
supports research and collaboration on alcohol-related harm
in countries where little research has taken place in the past
(Room 2011; Anderson et al. 2012).
At the same time, the Commission provides industry much
more access during consultations than the WHO. The European
Alcohol and Health Forum created in 2007 brings together
industry and public health representatives and the Commission
publications regularly feature policy solutions favoured by the
alcohol industry, including self-regulation of alcohol marketing
or training programmes for bartenders (European Commission
2012). In order to counter this greater access given to the
industry at the Commission, Eurocare now relies more heavily
on lobbying not only the Commission, but other institutions
and national governments through its affiliates (interview 15).
Such national ties are mobilized now to not only reach national
bureaucracies, but also other institutions, including the
Parliament. Although Eurocare supports the exclusion of the
industry from policy-making at the WHO, it accepts its role at
the Commission based on the different mandates of the two
institutions (interview 15).
While Eurocare is an established and relatively well-funded
player in Europe, GAPA’s limited resources prevented it from
establishing a permanent presence in Geneva. During the
2000s, the network made a difference largely based on the
participation of individual researchers in informal technical
networks that shaped the research output of the WHO on
alcohol. These scientists were responsible for the first Global
Status Report on Alcohol (World Health Organization 1999)
published by the WHO in 19997 and the first edition of Alcohol.
No Ordinary Commodity (Babor et al. 2003). Both publications
represented a key network output that set the global agenda by
offering a succinct summary of the most advanced research on
harm and interventions. Key members of the global health
network also later became main contributors to WHO’s Global
Status Report on Alcohol and Health, representing the defining
international statement on harm and desired policies (World
Health Organization 2011, p. vii).
But why did the network not expand much more rapidly
during the 2000s when the issue of alcohol control became
solidly placed on the global agenda? In contrast to the
successful US-domestic coalition-building efforts by George
Hacker and others in the 1980s, bringing together such
alliances at the global level is more challenging, in particular
since different organizations within the larger policy issue
network (see Figure 1) continued to advance their own problem
definitions and solutions. In addition, since the 1990s, these
differences among activists dedicated to addressing alcohol
harm have been systematically exploited by the alcohol industry
which actively seeks out partnerships with groups willing to
implement industry-sponsored strategies.
Network participation in the
negotiations of the Global Strategy,
2005–2010
Interest in putting alcohol back on the WHO agenda gathered
steam in the early 2000s. However, during this time period, the
WHO leadership focused its attention on the negotiations of
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which
represented the very first instance of an intergovernmental
treaty negotiated under WHO auspices (Mackay 2003).
Following the adoption of the FCTC in 2003, Nordic countries
began in 2004 regional consultations to put together a new
resolution to revive the alcohol agenda that had been dormant
since 1983. Their proposals were forwarded to the Executive
Board (EB) meetings and submitted to the WHA in May 2005.
Broader consultations elicited responses ranging from the
United States pushing for full industry participation in any
policy development to Thailand and other developing countries
arguing that the control effort was not ambitious enough. The
Icelandic presidency of the EB ultimately bridged the differ-
ences and advanced a consensus approach (Bull 2005).
In 2005, when the WHO adopted a resolution pointing
towards the Global Strategy, GAPA members increased advo-
cacy efforts by attending important WHO meetings in Geneva
and simultaneously working with national health officials in
member states (interview 10). In 2009, George Hacker, a board
member of GAPA, volunteered to spend four months over an
eight month period in Geneva to represent GAPA during the
final negotiations and adoption of the Global Strategy. The
World Council of Churches provided an office, allowing Hacker
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to focus on liaising with WHO staff and principled allies in
Scandinavian missions, conduct briefings for other civil society
groups, and educate country missions about alcohol harm and
effective policies (interview 20). As other GAPA members
joined temporarily for lobbying activities, this presence enabled
GAPA to facilitate a periodic exchange of information between
what was learned in Geneva and what their domestic allies
reported about government positions at home. It also allowed
GAPA to enter into more sustained collaborations with other
civil society actors, such as the World Medical Association and
the NGO Forum on Health (interview 10).
Building ongoing relationships with country missions became
crucial for Hacker and its colleagues because it was the only
way to learn about negotiations behind closed doors. This
knowledge was central to challenging industry interests and
simultaneously targeting country missions and domestic health
officials (interviews 10, 15). It also allowed Hacker and others
to directly intervene in the negotiation process. For example,
when specific passages about the role of industry in the Global
Strategy were negotiated, GAPA members noted ambiguous
language in different translations and alerted allied country
delegations. Thailand and New Zealand then set in motion a
technical correction on the floor that clarified the limited role of
the industry.
The adoption of the Global Strategy represented an important
success for the global health network. However, its passage
without a dedicated budget represents now a major challenge
for the network’s future effectiveness, and has created ongoing
tensions between member states demanding funding commit-
ments from the WHO core budget prior to dedicating their own
resources (interview 10). Without much action from states
(Zeigler and Babor 2011, p. 9–12), the alcohol industry has
focused on disseminating their own legislative templates and
using hundreds of projects around the world to cultivate key
relationships with domestic policy makers, ostensibly claiming
to offer their help in complying with the Global Strategy. While
the vast majority of industry efforts have no proven effective-
ness in reducing alcohol harm and are primarily designed to
improve industry reputation (Babor and Robaina 2012), GAPA
and its regional networks, IOGT International, and FORUT have
developed a few successful domestic interventions, but remain
hampered by insufficient resources.
In parallel to the run-up to the Global Strategy, the World
Economic Forum (WEF) and the United Nations (UN) began
debates about how to address the broader set of NCDs,
including how to integrate NCDs into the next phase of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGþ). In this context, a
new set of civil society actors entered as the NCD Alliance, an
umbrella group representing victims of diseases.8 In preparatory
meetings for the 2011 UN high-level meeting on NCDs, GAPA
representatives offered their own statement at the June NGO
forum (interview 20) and participated in a coalition of 150
NGOs demanding limits to the participation of industry in
policy deliberations about NCDs (interviews 10, 14). GAPA
members educated other NGOs about the specific problems
caused by the alcohol producers, and overall contributed to
keeping the issue on the agenda of UN member states and the
NCD Alliance (interviews 10, 20). This collaboration produced
the Conflicts of Interest Coalition,9 which had some success in
excluding commercial interests (Lincoln et al. 2011), but failed
to group the alcohol industry in the same category as tobacco.
Discussion: explaining successes and
limits of evidence-based advocacy
This study elaborated the role of a specific alcohol-focused
global health network across different phases of the policy
process, primarily agenda setting, policy formation and adop-
tion at the global level. The results section offers key lessons
about the interactions between network and actor features, the
policy environment and issue characteristics.
This global health network is composed of individual scien-
tists and activists sharing a common problem definition and a
focus on the alcohol industry as a ‘vector of disease.’ Since the
mid-1980s, the network has grown its individual membership
and slowly expanded to LMICs. KBS established a forum to
exchange research results, while GAPA and its associated
networks emerged as a focal point of regional- and global-
level advocacy. Organizations such as FORUT and IOGT existed
well before these two organizations, and have become signifi-
cant allies extending the network in limited ways to domestic
and local levels. These like-minded organizations play a crucial
complementary role by focusing on domestic capacity-building
and supporting the development of national alcohol policies in
selected countries.
The analysis revealed that the mobilization during the 2000s
was primarily based on an evidence-based focus on severity and
tractability (factors 8 and 9), framing as a public health issue
(factor 4), and some successes in forming a nascent global
network (factor 3). Network members were the key actors
prodding the WHO to record and track global increases in
health problems due to alcohol. Their research on severity as
well as policies to address harm was instrumental in turning a
condition into an issue. But this research did not yet succeed in
overcoming major challenges to broader coalition-building
which continue to be hampered by disagreements about
problem definition (heavy vs regular drinking) and the proper
focus of policy solutions (drunk driving, alcohol dependency
and recovery). This persistent wide range of responses to
alcohol harm prevents the emergence of a broad coalition. In
addition, the alcohol industry is effective in exploiting these
differences by supporting selected civil society efforts it deems
beneficial to its own image (factor 5).
Debates about the implementation of appropriate national
policies derived from the Global Strategy also pit the global
health network directly against a much more well-resourced
alcohol industry that uses its own lobby groups, sponsorships,
and research to establish an alternative problem definition
focused on heavy drinking only (Jernigan 2011; Babor and
Robaina 2012; Casswell 2013). The alcohol industry champions
self-regulation and educational campaigns in LMICs (Bakke
and Endal 2010) and favours public–private partnerships as a
strategy to attain full participation rights in both domestic and
global policy-making processes (interview 13). The increasing
activities of industry have mobilized the global health network,
but have also drawn a lot of the resources of the network into a
reactive position focused on containing industry influence
(e.g. Global Alcohol Policy Alliance 2013).
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Many GAPA members over the years became part of both the
‘technical networks’ (World Health Organization 2013b, p. 3),
but also more organized advocacy efforts supplementing the
research. These advocacy and framing efforts have been import-
ant in putting alcohol control on the global agenda (factor 4).
But compared to tobacco alcohol control did not get consistent
high-level support within the WHO, largely because it is viewed
as a highly controversial topic (interviews 22, 24) that requires
significant efforts of diplomatic consensus making. In addition,
GAPA lacks the resources to establish a permanent advocacy
presence at the WHO (factor 6). The current policy of the WHO
of giving privileged access to organizations with resources further
penalizes groups such as GAPA. Finally, since GAPA is still
mainly a loose coalition bringing together like-minded individ-
uals, it lacks the organizational capacity and governance struc-
ture needed to bring together a broad institutional membership
and increase its influence in important policy negotiations
regarding NCDs (factor 2).
Implications
The health network studied here faces significant future
challenges in competing for attention with other rising global
problems. This competitive environment requires developing new
strategies designed to expand its funding base and build broader
alliances (interviews 5, 8, 13 and 17). The 2010 adoption of the
Global Strategy signifies a new stage of shifting attention from
global agenda setting to developing specific policy instruments
and moving towards national implementation.
While the results of this study document the important ways
in which network members have shaped global policies against
alcohol harm, they also confirm that the network needs to
greatly expand its institutional membership and global foot-
print to remain an effective player in the future. For this
network to further expand its influence, increased funding
(factor 6) is a key step. But more funding will likely only be
forthcoming and benefiting the network if it goes along with
changes in leadership, governance, composition and underlying
norms (factors 1–3, 7). In order to be an important policy
player, the network needs to focus on better representing local
interests internationally as well as generating broader political
support through alliance building for its global advocacy. This
requires establishing a more ‘mature network’ (interview 24)
that goes beyond the bringing together of like-minded individ-
uals and establishes more robust mechanisms of governance
and decision making (Goos 2013, p. 16). Such an evolution is
also a precondition to coalition-building with other groups
(factor 5) and would also respond to the WHO’s desire to have
civil society groups present their perspectives with a more
unified voice (World Health Organization 2013b).
The absence of significant funding (factor 6) is a key
explanation for why this network has not yet developed the
capacity to sustainably link mobilization at the domestic,
regional and international levels. Beyond leadership and
internal governance, the core issue that has limited coalition-
building and fundraising in the past is the difficulty of
expanding a consensus about how to define and address the
problem. Although it is clear that alcohol abuse plays a major
role in domestic violence, road safety or mental health, groups
focused on these issues have yet to sustainably join the network
and support its policy approaches. Potential allies and donors
have to be convinced that alcohol control is a central part of
removing roadblocks to economic and human development in
LMICs (Room 2013). Alcohol control is certainly more contro-
versial today than tobacco control, but it represents a good ‘buy’
for major donors because reducing alcohol harm creates many
community benefits when reduced alcohol use leads to safer
roads, less violence, and increased productivity.
Increasing efforts at expanding the network (factor 3) should
target groups with mandates that are affected by alcohol
consumption (see Figure 1). Natural allies should be organiza-
tions representing the medical community (e.g. the World
Medical Association), organizations representing victims of
diseases (e.g. the International Diabetes Foundation, the World
Heart Federation, or the Union for International Cancer Control),
injury or trauma, and organizations interested in questions of
economic development adversely affected by alcohol use (e.g.
major development NGOs). There are also a number of organ-
izations explicitly engaged in regulating industry marketing in
other sectors, including Consumers International or Oxfam
International. A recent review of GAPA commissioned by
FORUT highlighted the need to think more systematically about
extending the ‘alliance towards non-alcohol specific agencies’
(Goos 2013, p. 16). GAPA members have built such temporary
coalitions at domestic levels and temporarily for the Global
Strategy and the NCD agenda, but getting sustained broader
support for alcohol control measures is crucial to enhancing
legitimacy and power (interviews 10, 20, 22, 24).
Challenges regarding such coalition building vary depending
on who is targeted and how the problem is framed (factor 4).
Most difficult will be building coalitions with self-help groups
(e.g. Alcoholics Anonymous, AA) and the recovery and treat-
ment communities, in particular when such groups firmly
embrace a frame of individual responsibility.
‘‘And this is part of our frustration too because you have the treatment
community, the people who deal with the addicts [. . .] and their
whole orientation is toward the individual’’ (interview 1)
For groups focused on diseases as well as associations repre-
senting the medical professions, addressing alcohol consump-
tion may compete with other health priorities. In addition,
while the global health network described here champions
mostly supply side policies (regulations on pricing, availability
and marketing), such preventative approaches may be seen as
directly competing with efforts to increase funding for research
and treatment of cancer and other health issues. None of these
challenges to coalition-building are impossible to overcome, as
the example of CSPI’s 1980s campaign shows (interviews 3,
20). The public health perspective resonates particularly well
with a human rights framework and offers an important basis
for coalition-building. Compared to the industry’s singling out
of a small minority of individuals as ‘fundamentally different
from normal drinkers’ (Beauchamp 1980, p. 181/2), the public
health approach rejects stigmatization and could become a
powerful basis for coalition building.
While expanding the network is crucial to increasing political
influence, the analysis also shows that successful network
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expansion requires constant attention to goal alignment. When
the AMA and the Lancet demanded a framework convention on
alcohol in the mid-2000s, some GAPA members felt an
immediate backlash among WHO member states in Geneva.
The call for the framework convention was seen as counter-
productive since any such demand raised levels of resistance
against global action significantly. For those trying to move
forward in getting the non-binding agreement adopted, the
discussion about a framework convention turned out to be very
distracting (interview 20). Once a network moves from simple
agenda setting to policy formation, leadership and governance
play an increasingly important role in ensuring that network
members feel properly represented, but also can be asked to
support an agreed upon strategic approach.
This case study contributes also broader lessons to the study
of global health issues and transnational alliances. First, the
alcohol case focuses attention on the conflict between global
health networks and powerful industry interests. This differen-
tiates this case from health conditions where the disease itself
or the public’s fatalism represents the main challenges to
overcome. The study provides important insights into how the
presence of powerful opponents has ambiguous effects on the
network’s evolution and alliance building efforts. Second,
the case study confirms the importance of popular support for
transnational mobilization. Researchers organized in epistemic
communities can be highly effective in shaping agendas and
policy adoption based on their privileged access via elite
networks to decision makers. But beyond the creation of
agendas and consensus at important meetings, different types
of networks with broader popular support are needed in order
to mobilize sustained support for the domestic implementation
of specific policy instruments.
While this study’s conclusions emerged from detailed docu-
ment analysis and expert interviews, there are important
limitations to consider when assessing the ability to generalize
the results to other cases. The single case study design and the
availability of data represented the most important limitations.
In terms of information gathering, limited written documenta-
tion about network creation and evolution as well as difficulties
to confirm results based on several independent sources repre-
sented core challenges. To address some of the limitations of
using interviews, anonymity was guaranteed, and interviews
consistently focused on eliciting different views on crucial events.
Comparative lessons drawn are not based on this single case, but
only emerge from the joint evaluation of the alcohol and tobacco
cases (Gneiting and Schmitz, 2016) as well as situating the
alcohol case within the larger framework of the GHAPP studies.
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Endnotes
1 Based on its focus on public policy and an assessment of minimal risk
to informants, the study was granted exempt status by the
Institutional Review Boards of American University and Syracuse
University.
2 Results were presented at the 2012 American Public Health
Association meetings, the Alcohol Policy 16 conference (April
2013), the International Studies Association meetings (April 2013),
and the Global Alcohol Policy Conference in Seoul, Republic of
Korea (October 2013).
3 ‘‘Adherents of this [new public health] approach tended to search for
defects in the community and the environment rather than in the
individual; to emphasize predictability and usualness rather than
random deviance; they tried to think about prevention rather than
merely repairing and treating’’ (Ryan 1971: 15/6).
4 From 1986 to 1996, worldwide activities of so-called ‘social aspect’
organizations increased by 150 per cent, primarily pushing educa-
tional programmes and seeking to improve the image of the
alcohol industry (Houghton 1998). In 1995, Marcus Grant left his
position at the WHO as director of alcohol programmes to become
the first president of the newly founded International Center for
Alcohol Policies (ICAP) based in Washington D.C. ICAP is entirely
funded by major alcohol producers.
5 The Institute was founded in 1987 and renamed Alcohol Justice in 2011.
6 Core funding for the two-day conference came from the Institute of
Alcohol Studies, IAS, based in London ($65 000), the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation ($50 000), and the WHO ($10 000).
7 The report was modeled after Tobacco or Health: A Global Status Report
released by the WHO in 1997. Two subsequent reports published in
2004 and 2011 continued to track alcohol harm.
8 The four founding members are: the International Diabetes Federation
(IDF), the World Heart Federation (WHF), the International Union
against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease (The Union), and the Union
for International Cancer Control (UICC).
9 The coalition is led by Baby Milk Action, the organization that also led
the Nestlé boycott.
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